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Origins of the Great Inflation
Allan H. Meltzer
used, is misleading. It mixes the effects of one-
time price level changes (from currency devalua-
tions, tariffs, and excises, but, in the 1970s, mainly
supply shocks) with sustained rates of price
change arising from the demand side. This is par-
ticularly important for the Great Inflation because
the recorded peak rates of inflation reflect both
the flawed or mistaken management of economic
policies and the two large oil price shocks of the
1970s. Figure 1 shows the rise and fall of the
reported inflation rate. Using a dummy variable
to represent the oil price shock, we get the adjusted
inflation series for 1979-80 shown in Figure 1.2
This crude method attributes as much as half the
reported peak inflation rate to a one-time price
change. The adjustment suggests that the main-
tained rate of inflation never exceeded 8 to 10
percent.
An alternative measure, the rate of money
wage growth, shows a maximum rate of increase
T
he Great Inflation of 1965 to the mid-
1980s was the central monetary event
of the latter half of the 20th century. Its
economic cost was large. It destroyed
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates,
bankrupted much of the thrift industry, heavily
taxed the U.S. capital stock, and arbitrarily redis-
tributed income and wealth.
It was also a political event, as are all major
policy issues. This paper argues that the Great
Inflation cannot be understood fully without its
political dimension. Political pressure to coordi-
nate policy reinforced widespread beliefs that
coordination of fiscal and monetary policies was
desirable.
Inflation started in an economy close to price
stability. The annual reported rate of consumer
price increase rose from 1.07 percent in January
1965 to 13.70 percent in March 1980 before declin-
ing in 1983. Measured inflation only reached its
local trough of 1.12 percent in December 1986.1
This method of measuring inflation, though widely
1 Using the GNP/GDP deflator the quarterly dates are 1965:Q1,
1974:Q3, and 1986:Q1; the respective annualized quarterly data
are 1.2 percent, 14.3 percent, and 0.7 percent.
2 The dummy variable is included in a first-order autoregressive
equation for consumer price index (CPI) inflation. The adjusted R2
for the equation is 0.99, and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.59.
The use of the dummy variable is a crude attempt to correct for
the use of a fixed-weight price level following a large change in
one of its components. Nominal wage growth does not show a
comparable change.
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The Great Inflation from 1965 to 1984 is the climactic monetary event of the last part of the 20th
century. This paper analyzes why it started and why it continued for many years. Like others, it
attributes the start of inflation to analytic errors, particularly the widespread acceptance of the
simple Keynesian model with its implication that monetary and fiscal policy should be coordinated.
In practice, that meant that the Federal Reserve financed a large part of the fiscal deficit. This paper
gives a large role to political decisionmaking. Continuation of inflation depended on political
choices, analytic errors, and the entrenched belief that inflation would continue.
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Average Annualized Hourly Earnings Growth, 12-Month Moving Average, 1971-80of 9.3 percent in February 1981, when computed
as a 12-month moving average of monthly data.
This measure rises from 3.4 percent in early 1965
and does not return to this range until early in
1984. Figure 2 shows the wage data. They have a
less-exaggerated response to the oil shocks of the
1970s and show considerable persistence.
The Great Inflation raises three main questions.
Why did the inflation start? Why did it continue
for nearly 20 years? Why did it end when it did
rather than earlier or later? This paper answers
the first, partially answers the second, and mainly
neglects the third. A simple answer to the third
question has a political dimension also: Policy-
makers stopped believing in and taking the policy
actions that sustained inflation, and a new Presi-
dent supported and encouraged anti-inflation
monetary policy. Making that case requires more
attention to the details of policy actions in the
1980s than space permits. My research to date
has not completed work on the 1970s and 1980s,
so the evidence about persistence of inflation on
which I rely must be extended to the late 1970s.
Until that is done, my answer to the second ques-
tion remains incomplete.3
During the inflation, I criticized policymakers
for their errors, for failing to prevent inflation and
failing to end it. Along with Karl Brunner and
others on the Shadow Open Market Committee, I
proposed alternative policy actions. This paper
criticizes the policies also. It is important to note
that I believe that much of what policymakers
did, or failed to do, was close to the consensus of
mainstream economists. And it was close also to
popular beliefs about the importance of inflation
as expressed in surveys and opinion polls taken
at the time. That does not relieve policymakers
of responsibility, but it puts their errors in the
context in which they made them.
The Gallup organization repeatedly asked
respondents to state what they regarded as the
most important problem facing the country. Data
from the beginning of 1970, when annual CPI
inflation reached 6 percent, show that only 14
percent named inflation or “the high cost of 
living” as one of the most important problems.
The percentage rose and fell with reported
inflation in the 1970s. It did not remain persist-
ently above 50 percent and as high as 70 percent
until 1980-81.
Politicians and policymakers are usually
reluctant to take actions that are socially costly
or unpopular. The Federal Reserve is an independ-
ent agency, not directly subject to control by the
administration in office. The paper shows why
the Federal Reserve hesitated to act, ultimately
failed to prevent inflation from starting, and
allowed it to continue. By the 1980s, the public
and policymakers had learned that inflation was
costly. Voters elected a President committed to
reducing it, and the Federal Reserve had a
Chairman who changed procedures and, most
importantly, remained resolute in the commitment
to reduce inflation.
PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS
A large and growing literature addresses the
causes of the Great Inflation. Both economists
and political scientists have considered the issue.
This section does not attempt a comprehensive
survey, but it briefly summarizes some represen-
tative contributions and explains what I find
supported by data or internal records.
Tufte (1978) offers a political interpretation.
Based on work such as Kramer (1971) and many
later studies, his work shows that election out-
comes depend positively on employment, real
disposable income, or similar variables and nega-
tively on inflation. Quoting Nordhaus (1975, p.
185), Tufte argues that “politically determined
policy choice will have lower unemployment
and higher inflation than is optimal.” Barro and
Gordon (1983) reached a similar conclusion in a
different model.
One problem with these models is that they
explain policy outcomes for a period restricted
to the Great Inflation. They explain neither the
period before nor the period after the Great
Inflation. To explain observed changes in the
inflation rate, the models require improbably large
changes in the so-called natural rate of unemploy-
ment. They suggest why it can be politically costly
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3 Much of the material comes from the second volume of my study
A History of the Federal Reserve (Meltzer, forthcoming), which is
now in process.
 to reduce an inflation that has started, but they do
not adequately explain either why inflation ended
or why, once ended, it did not return. Second, the
political models explain what politicians prefer,
but they avoid an explanation of why an ostensi-
bly independent Federal Reserve cooperated.
Economists’ explanations fall into three
groups. The first cites theoretical errors: Policy-
makers used the wrong model to choose actions
or interpret data. The second cites misinformation:
Policymakers believed that their actions would
reduce or prevent inflation, but the data misled
them. The third is that officials in the 1960s neg-
lected or dismissed money growth as important
for inflation. This is a special case of the first
explanation that merits separate consideration.
I discuss each in turn.
Theoretical Errors
There is little reason to doubt and abundant
evidence to support the conclusion that in the
late 1960s the Council of Economic Advisers
under Gardner Ackley and the Board’s staff under
Daniel Brill relied heavily on a simple Keynesian
model with a nonvertical, long-run Phillips curve.
Romer and Romer (2002) develop this reasoning.4
Combining this model with a belief that, in James
Tobin’s familiar phrase—it takes many Harberger
triangles to fill an Okun gap—we get a rationali-
zation or defense of inflationary policies.5
Another explanation of this kind points to the
misinterpretation of interest rates or neglect of
the distinction between real and nominal interest
rates. This was a long-standing Federal Reserve
problem (Meltzer, 2003). According to Taylor
(1999), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), and others,
until 1981, the Federal Reserve did not increase
the market interest rate enough in response to
inflation to offset the negative effect of inflation
on (ex post) real interest rates and on expected
future interest rates. Orphanides (2003) shows
that, at the margin, the Federal Reserve’s response
was sufficient to compensate for inflation. It
remains true, however, that ex post real short-term
interest rates remained negative during much of
the 1970s.6
Suppose we accept Taylor’s interpretation
and conclude that the Federal Reserve did not
raise nominal interest rates enough. We are left
with two questions. First, didn’t the market recog-
nize the error and raise (the more relevant) long-
term interest rates and other asset prices? Second,
then as now, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) looked at many different series. They
knew that inflation continued and rose at times
to new levels. How could they fail to see (or learn)
that their actions were inadequate to slow or stop
inflation? The data in Figure 1, or similar data
for the period, were available at every meeting.
I do not question the claim that the simple
Keynesian model, such as is found in Ackley
(1961), with a nonvertical long-run Phillips curve,
misled policymakers in the 1960s by overstating
the role of fiscal policy, especially temporary
changes; understating the role of money growth;
failing to distinguish between anticipated and
unanticipated inflation and between the effects
of temporary and permanent tax rate changes;
and neglecting the role of inflationary anticipations
on interest rates, wages, and prices. However, the
Nixon administration economists did not share
many of these beliefs. They accepted that the
long-run Phillips curve was vertical, and they
emphasized the importance of money growth for
inflation. Nevertheless, under their guidance,
inflation increased before the oil-price shock of
1973 and continued through their term in office.
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4 Hargrove and Morley (1984) have interviews with Council chairmen
in which they state their interpretations. Okun (1970) explains
that he regarded Friedman’s (1968) explanation of the vertical
long-run Phillips curve of little practical relevance.
5 The argument is flawed. Tobin compares the one-time loss from
unemployment (Okun gap) to the loss from nonindexed inflation
(Harberger triangle). Losses from inflation continue as long as
inflation continues. Fischer (1981) shows many ways inflation is
costly that are not captured in the Harberger or Bailey triangle.
See also Feldstein (1982) for effects on capital.
6 Recent papers compare two explanations of negative real short-term
rates. One attributes the result to chance, principally unfavorable
shocks (oil); the other cites policy errors (see Collard and Dellas,
2004, and Velde, 2004). These are not alternatives. Both could be
and probably were relevant. One problem is that the bad luck mainly
affected the price level, not the maintained inflation rate. A market
that recognized temporary and permanent changes would have
different responses of short- and long-term interest rates to such
changes, hence different responses of economic activity. Between
the end of December 1972 and December 1973, 3-month Treasury
bill rates rose from 5.13 to 7.50 percent; 10-year constant maturity
Treasury bonds rose only from 6.40 to 6.87 percent. This is one
illustration of the difference between the two definitions of inflation.
 Despite their beliefs about money and inflation,
they urged faster money growth in 1970-72 and
at other times.
At most, reliance on the simple Keynesian
model is part of an explanation of the start of the
inflation. There has to be more to the story, because
it is the Federal Reserve, not the Council of
Economic Advisers, that makes monetary policy.
William McChesney Martin Jr. was Chairman of
the Board of Governors at the start of the inflation
and until 1970. Martin did not rely on explicit
economic models, Keynesian or other.7 He said
many times that he did not find economic models
useful, and he gave most attention to market data
and market participants, not economists. Martin
made many speeches opposing inflation and
pointing out its costs. As I note below, he did not
welcome what happened during the last years of
his management of the Federal Reserve, from 1965
to early 1970.
Gordon (1977, p. 276) concluded that his
model based on a Phillips curve failed “to explain
the increased variance of inflation during 1971-76
as compared to the pre-1971 period.” The model
did better at explaining the cumulative change.
Gordon concluded that the Phillips curve became
steeper after 1971, but he offered no explanation
of the change. The change in the estimated coeffi-
cients of his equations from estimates for earlier
periods suggests that the underlying structure had
changed. The likely reason was that the public
had learned to expect inflation.8 A common find-
ing at the time was that the trade-off between
inflation and unemployment became steeper
(imposing a more inflationary cost of reducing
unemployment) as time passed.
Misinformation
In a series of papers, Orphanides showed that
the information available to policymakers from
1987 to 1992 differed, at times substantially, from
the data published subsequently for output and
inflation. One of his papers (Orphanides, 2001,
Figure 2) shows that the output gap, as measured
at the time, was generally larger than the output
gap based on data recorded in the revised national
accounts. The difference was often sufficient to
mislead policymakers adjusting policy in response
to the output gap and inflation. Orphanides
(2004) shows that the principal sources of error
were two misperceptions: (i) Through much of
the 1970s, policymakers assumed that full employ-
ment meant an unemployment rate of about 4 per-
cent; they were slow to recognize that the so-called
natural rate of unemployment had increased. (ii)
Productivity growth slowed in the late 1960s or
early 1970s, but policymakers continued to expect
a return to the higher productivity growth of earlier
postwar years.
Orphanides’s explanation has considerable
verisimilitude, as he shows. I would add that
policymakers erred in treating the output loss
following the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks as evi-
dence of recession, instead of a one-time transfer
to the oil producers that permanently reduced
the level of output. This contributed to the mis-
measurement of the output gap and the desire to
raise output by monetary expansion. This is an
example of the pervasive problem created by fail-
ing to distinguish between one-time changes and
maintained rates of change. The problem remains
currently in discussions of inflation targeting. At
the time, Germany, Switzerland, and Japan did
not make this error and experienced less inflation
despite greater dependence on imported oil. This
shows that alternatives were known. Fortunately,
the Federal Reserve did not repeat the error in 2004.
The more general point based on Orphanides’s
work is that the Federal Reserve underestimated
inflation throughout the Great Inflation. The per-
sistence of the error raises a question: Why did
the FOMC members not recognize the error after
a few years and adjust their procedures?
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7 Of course, anyone who makes repeated decisions, and does not
act haphazardly, can be described as having a framework in mind.
This is far different from saying that Martin had an economic model
relating interest rates or free reserves to output and prices. As he
often said, he thought of policy as a river that had to be controlled
enough to irrigate the fields without flooding them. After reading
Martin’s statements in Board and FOMC meetings, in White House
conferences, and in the question-and-answer sessions in Congress
(as opposed to statements that his staff wrote for him), I cannot find
an economic model. In 1963-64, as a temporary member of the
House Banking Committee staff, I interviewed Chairman Martin
and asked him to explain how he thought monetary policy worked.
He explained about rivers irrigating fields.
8 Sargent (1999) develops an explanation that depends on the belief
that there was a permanent (or long-run) trade-off between inflation
and unemployment. Sargent (2002, pp. 80-85) supplements that
explanation by pointing to several additional errors.
 The Role of Money Growth
A noticeable change occurred in the 1960s.
By 1960-61, policy had driven the CPI inflation
rate from an annual rate of 3.5 percent in 1958 to
1 percent or less in 1959-61. Under the influence
of Winfield W. Riefler, secretary of the FOMC and
an influential adviser, Chairman Martin at times
testified about keeping the average rate of mone-
tary growth close to the average rate of output
growth.
After Riefler retired at the end of 1958, this
model of inflation disappeared from the Board
and its staff. Malcolm Bryan of the Richmond
Reserve Bank and D.C. Johns and Darryl Francis
of the St. Louis Bank brought this analysis to the
FOMC in the 1960s, without much impact on
decisions. Martin at this stage dismissed money
growth, claiming that he did not understand the
money supply. Governor Sherman Maisel, at the
Board from 1965 to 1972, is an exception. He
often urged a policy of controlling money growth.
He was not, however, willing to control inflation
if it required more than a modest increase in the
unemployment rate.
Figure 3 suggests that, in addition to its error
in measuring growth of real output, neglect of
money growth—here, growth of the monetary
base—contributed to the policy error.9 Comparing
Figures 1 and 3 shows that growth of the base in
excess of output growth leads the inflation rate
throughout the period. Excess growth of the base
would have been a useful statistic for future infla-
tion. The Federal Reserve Board staff gave it little
or no weight.
Economists in the Nixon administration did
not neglect money growth. Neglect of money
growth contributes to an understanding of the
start of the inflation in 1965-66, but neglect cannot
explain why inflation continued after 1969. Econ-
omists in the Nixon administration watched
reported money growth closely and overempha-
sized the effect of short-term changes. Their larger
error was that most often they wanted to increase
money growth to reduce the unemployment rate.
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9 Base growth is from Anderson and Rasche (1999), so it adjusts for


















































Year-Over-Year Monetary Base Growth Minus Year-Over-Year Real GDP Growth, 1963:Q1–1981:Q3A Remaining Puzzle
The references to Orphanides, Sargent, Taylor,
and Romer and Romer offer explanations of the
Great Inflation compatible with the more general
statement that policymakers ignored economic
theories that were available. Indeed, the monetarist
critique at the time emphasized these differences,
as Franco Modigliani (1977) later acknowledged.
The remaining large puzzle is to explain why
this happened. Why did the Federal Reserve dis-
miss for years the long-run vertical Phillips curve
and the effect of inflation on nominal interest rates,
wages, and anticipations more generally? Proposi-
tions that attribute the Great Inflation to analytical
errors of one kind or another ought to be supple-
mented by an explanation of why the error per-
sisted for 15 years before policy changed. As is
well known, policymakers began anti-inflation
policies as early as 1966 and several times after—
1969, 1973, 1978-79, and 1980. They were aware
of the Great Inflation but, until 1979-82, they did
not persist in policies to end it.
My main objection to explanations based on
persistent policy errors is that they are incomplete.
Federal Reserve officials could observe inflation
rates. They knew that their policies had not ended
inflation. Most often inflation was above their
forecast. Yet, they did not change course. Arthur F.
Burns, who became Chairman of the Board of
Governors in 1970, was a distinguished economist,
influenced more by data and induction than by
deductive theories. Yet, he also failed to stop the
inflation and, at times, saw it rise to rates never
before experienced in U.S. peacetime history.
Most of the FOMC members were not ideologues
or slavish adherents to a particular theory. Most
regarded themselves as practical men, meaning
they were not attached to any particular theory
and were willing to discard analyses that did not
work. Martin especially was both dismissive of
economic theories and strongly in favor of price
stability and the fixed exchange rate system. Yet,
he left the chairmanship with CPI inflation at a 6
percent annual rate and the fixed exchange rate
system on the edge of collapse.
While I accept the importance of analytic
errors, I do not believe that either the start of infla-
tion or the 15 years that followed can be explained
fully as a consequence of errors in the economic
theory that the FOMC applied. In the rest of the
paper, the members of the FOMC and the admin-
istrations explain their reasoning.
One additional caveat is that the Federal
Reserve is not a monolith. Members of the FOMC
have independent views. Particularly in the 1960s,
they were mostly noneconomists. They had con-
siderable difficulty agreeing on how to implement
actions, as Maisel (Diary, 1973) documents fully.
The staff, or part of it, had a model, but insiders
who have written about the 1960s and 1970s often
emphasize inconsistency in the choices made by
the FOMC (see Lombra and Moran, 1980, Pierce,
1980, and Maisel, Diary, various years).
The international character of the Great
Inflation is sometimes advanced as support for
explanations based on errors in economic theory.
The claim is that many countries made the same
errors, particularly denial of the natural rate
hypothesis. All experienced inflation. Once policy-
makers everywhere accepted the natural rate
hypothesis, time inconsistency theory, under-
standing of the need for credibility, and rational
expectations, inflation declined.
Appealing as this argument is to economists,
it fails to separate the start of inflation and its
continuance. The start of inflation occurred under
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates.
Surplus countries experienced inflation because
they would not appreciate their currencies to
stop the inflation, and those that did appreciate
made at most modest increases in their exchange
rate until 1971. They were fully aware of the prob-
lem; they did not want a solution that reduced
their exports or slowed the growth of output and
employment.10 They opposed dollar depreciation.
Once the fixed exchange rate system ended, Japan,
Germany, Switzerland, and Austria reduced
their inflation rates. Others permitted inflation
to continue or increase.
The United Kingdom was the principal deficit
country, aside from the United States. It comes
closest to supporting the policy errors (or prefer-
ences) explanation. Policymakers in both U.K.
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 parties accepted and used a simple Keynesian
model. The long delay of sterling devaluation
from 1964 to 1967 and the policy measures chosen
are evidence of the reluctance to slow growth
(Nelson, 2003).
WHY INFLATION STARTED
The Great Inflation started while William
McChesney Martin Jr. was Chairman of the Board
of Governors. Martin was not a wild radical eager
to confiscate the wealth in outstanding bonds
and fixed nominal values. He was not a radical
of any kind. On the contrary, he was a symbol of
conservative fiscal policy and “sound” finance.
His contemporaries often portrayed him in cari-
cature wearing a high starched collar and looking
like a refugee from the 19th century. He gave many
speeches denouncing unbalanced federal budgets,
balance of payments deficits, and fiscal profligacy.
Martin seems a most unlikely person to pre-
side over monetary policy at the start of the Great
Inflation. Yet, until January 1970, he was in a
position to stop it. He failed to do so. When he
left office, broad-based measures of prices had
increased 5 to 6 percent in the previous year, an
unusually high rate of inflation for a relatively
peaceful period.
Inflation was not new in 1965, and it was not
new to Martin. He had successfully ended the
inflation that followed the Korean War. By late
1952, average annual increases in consumer prices
reached 1 to 2 percent and continued to fall after
price controls ended. By 1954-55, inflation was
modestly negative. Again, in 1959-60, average
annual CPI fell to 0 to 2 percent from 3 to 4 percent
in 1957-58.
The start of the Great Inflation—the sustained
increase in the price level—was a monetary event.
Monetary policy could have mitigated or pre-
vented the inflation but failed to do so. This sec-
tion discusses two questions: Why did the Federal
Reserve permit inflation to return in 1965? Why
did it not repeat the actions that had ended infla-
tion twice in the 1950s?
The detail in the chapter of my history
(Meltzer, forthcoming) from which this material
is drawn suggests not one answer but several.
Three seem most important. First is Martin’s
leadership and beliefs. Second, neither Martin,
nor his colleagues in the FOMC, nor the staff had
a valid theory of inflation or much of a theory at
all. Nor did they have a common set of beliefs
about how the economy worked. And some of
their main ideas were wrong, as the literature cited
earlier points out. Third, institutional arrange-
ments hindered or prevented the taking of timely
effective action and, thus, increased inflation.
Beliefs and arrangements worked together to allow
inflation to start and to continue. One of the most
important arrangements was the Employment Act.
The prevalent belief was that the Act required
coordination of fiscal and monetary policy to
achieve an unemployment rate of 4 percent or
less. This became a national objective.
Martin’s Leadership and Beliefs
Martin was a highly respected Chairman. He
believed passionately in the independence of the
Federal Reserve, and he had the courage to insist
on its independence when pressured by President
Johnson or by presidential staff and officials. In
his oral history, he described fully and at length
the pressure from the President to rescind the
discount rate increase in 1965 and his resistance
to presidential pressure at other times.
However, at times, Martin responded to
administration pressure by hesitating or delaying
action. Although he made a widely reported
speech about the dangers of inflation at Columbia
University in June 1965, the Federal Reserve did
not raise interest rates until December. He urged
delay in October 1965. His reason was coordina-
tion. He told the FOMC that “he had the respon-
sibility for maintaining System relations within
the Government…and he had made that one of
his principal concerns during the fourteen years
he had held his present office” (FOMC, Minutes,
October 12, 1965, pp. 68-69).
He was not confrontational, dogmatic, or
unwilling to change his mind. He admitted mis-
takes and respected Board members who disagreed
with him. If a majority did not agree with him
about a policy change, he would, if necessary, wait
months until a majority formed.
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was independent of government, although at times
restricted by gold-standard rules. The government
rarely intervened in Federal Reserve decisions,
despite having two members on the Board; the
Federal Reserve operated independently and
divulged little information.
By the 1950s, standards had changed. Central
banks controlled one part of the policy “mix” that
affected the level of employment, output, and
prices. Although no longer represented on the
Board, successive administrations recognized
that the public expected government to maintain
high employment rates and avoid inflation. The
Employment Act of 1946 codified this practice.
The prevailing interpretation of the
Employment Act changed the meaning of central
bank independence and with it the goal of mone-
tary policy. In an oft-quoted remark, Martin
defined independence indirectly by saying that
the Federal Reserve had to take away the punch
bowl while the party was still on. His more formal
statement described the Federal Reserve as inde-
pendent within the government, not independent
of the government. To those like Martin, that state-
ment went beyond recognizing that the Federal
Reserve was the agent of Congress—it also recog-
nized that Congress had delegated and could
withdraw its constitutional responsibility to coin
money and regulate its value.
The March 1951 Accord freed the Federal
Reserve from Treasury control of interest rate
levels but retained its co-equal responsibility for
debt management. The Treasury had to price its
issues in light of current market interest rates.
The Federal Reserve’s role was to prevent the
market from failing to accept a Treasury issue at
the announced price; in practice that meant the
Federal Reserve supplied enough reserves to
keep interest rates from rising around the time
the Treasury sold its offering.
Martin explained many times that Congress
voted the budget and approved deficit finance.
The Federal Reserve was not empowered to pre-
vent the deficit or refuse to finance it. Central bank
independence stopped well short of that. There-
fore, he complained often about the size and fre-
quency of budget deficits, but the Federal Reserve
provided the reserves to finance them. And it
rarely felt able to remove the additional reserves
after it supported the Treasury’s offering. That
would have meant higher interest rates and a
refusal to finance the deficits that Congress voted.
It also implied temporarily higher unemployment.
The problem arose because the Federal
Reserve contributed to debt management by adopt-
ing an even-keel policy. The Treasury announced
the interest rate on its note and bond issues, and
it considered an issue to have failed if there was
large attrition. Under the even-keel policy, the
Federal Reserve kept interest rates from changing
before, during, and for a few weeks after the issue
was sold. If the issue failed, the System bought
it, supplying reserves.
Failures were rare. More often the System sup-
plied enough reserves at the fixed interest rate to
permit banks to buy unsold issues. These reserves
generally remained with the banks; the Federal
Reserve rarely withdrew them subsequently.
Auctioning notes and bonds would have
avoided the problem. Both the Federal Reserve
and the Treasury opposed securities auctions
(except for bills) when the issue arose in the
1950s and 1960s. Finally, in the early 1970s, the
Treasury began to auction debt, and the even-keel
policy ended. Even-keel is only important for the
start and early years of inflation.
The Federal Reserve reduced inflation from
3.5 percent to about zero at the end of the 1950s.
The Eisenhower administration shifted from a
budget deficit to a surplus between fiscal 1959
and 1960, so debt management played a small
role and there was no large increment of debt to
finance. The Federal Reserve could end inflation
with a maximum federal funds rate below 4 per-
cent. This was not the case in the early years of
the Great Inflation, 1965 to 1968. The Johnson
administration maintained its spending for
Vietnam and the Great Society. Congress delayed
approving the surtax. The budget deficit reached
$25 billion current dollars, 3 percent of gross
national product (GNP). The Federal Reserve had
to invoke even-keel frequently. Monetary base
growth remained at 5 to 6 percent, compared with
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slowed, so the excess of base growth over output
growth rose, as shown in Figure 3.
In the early 1960s, Martin regarded unemploy-
ment as structural, not responsive to expansive
monetary and fiscal policies. Kennedy adminis-
tration economists blamed restrictive fiscal and
monetary policies, including “fiscal drag,” the
tendency of the budget to reach balance before the
economy reached full employment. They wanted
permanent tax reduction supported by an expan-
sive monetary policy to finance the deficit. In their
analysis, policy coordination meant that the gov-
ernment used fiscal actions to adjust the economy.
The Federal Reserve was supposed to support
the policy by preventing an increase in market
interest rates. Martin did not agree with the analy-
sis or the policy, and he later decided that he
had been wrong. But he agreed that the Federal
Reserve should assist in financing the deficit
because Congress approved it. Thus, he accepted
“coordination.”11 Later, when deficits increased
in size and Treasury offerings became larger and
more frequent, the Federal Reserve had fewer days
on which it could increase interest rates and more
debt issues to help manage. 
Martin often said that monetary policy alone
could not prevent inflation or achieve balance in
international payments. Given his belief that the
Federal Reserve shared responsibility for success-
ful deficit finance, his statement became true if it
required excessive money growth (see Figure 3).
Some of his successors showed that inflation
could be reduced even in a period with large
deficits. In the 1980s, the federal government ran
large, persistent deficits. The Federal Reserve had
an independent policy, did not assist in deficit
finance, and did not coordinate policy. The impor-
tant operating changes were the end of the Federal
Reserve’s even-keel policy of holding interest rates
constant when the Treasury sold notes or bonds
and the end of policy coordination as practiced
in the 1960s. By the 1980s, the Treasury auctioned
its securities and let the market price them instead
of having the Treasury set a price that the Federal
Reserve felt bound to support.
The Role of Economics
Martin often began a conversation by saying,
“I am not an economist.” He had little interest in
economic explanations of inflation, claimed not
to “understand” the money stock, and did not have
much confidence in the accuracy of economic data.
He saw, correctly, that short-term changes were
unreliable and were often revised substantially.
Martin did not articulate a coherent theory
or explanation of the relation of Federal Reserve
policy to economic activity and prices. When
pressed, he fell back on his analogy to a river.
Other members of the FOMC held a wide range
of views about monetary policy. Several presidents
and Board members were practical men without
much interest in theoretical explanations of infla-
tion or economic activity. Bryan (Atlanta Fed) and
Johns and later Francis (St. Louis Fed) emphasized
money growth and at times proposed procedures
for adjusting policy to control money growth, but
they never received majority support. A few mem-
bers of the FOMC, and a growing number of senior
staff members, relied on some version of Keynesian
theory. To the extent that there was a dominant
view, in the early 1960s, the members favored
making judgments for the next three weeks based
on observable data. If it seemed appropriate, the
decision could be revised at the next meeting. This
meant that there was no consensus to act against
inflation or unemployment until it occurred and
was well established. That Chairman Martin was
the leading member of this group contributed to
its dominance. We know now that this procedure
is not optimal.
A by-product of this atheoretical approach
was the vague instruction given to the account
manager, who was responsible for implementing
FOMC policy action. Unable to agree on how
their actions affected their longer-term goals, the
members could not decide how best to implement
policy actions. The Manager of the System Open
Market Account had considerable discretion and,
the minutes show, members frequently differed
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11 The Quadriad became a principal means of coordination. The
Chairman joined the Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the
Budget, and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in
meetings with the President. The Quadriad started in the Eisenhower
administration, but it became a principal means of influencing
Martin during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
 over whether the Manager had followed instruc-
tions. The Manager’s focus was the money market,
so his decisions gave much more weight to current
technical details than to longer-range objectives
such as inflation. For example, after 1970, the
Manager rarely paid attention to the FOMC’s
proviso clause, instructing him to change money
market conditions whenever growth of reserves
(or some aggregate) became excessive or deficient.
Instructions in the 1960s, to maintain the
“tone and feel of the market,” achieve moderate
ease, or err on the side of restraint, gave little direc-
tion even when the members agreed on objectives.
Often the instructions in the directive and the
stated consensus were so imprecise that one mem-
ber would criticize the Manager’s actions as incon-
sistent with his instructions and another would
follow with praise for the Manager’s performance.
The use of free reserves as a policy target
added to the dissatisfaction that some members
expressed. Free reserves rose when member bank
borrowing fell, and conversely. Borrowing rose
and fell cyclically, so free reserves moved pro-
cyclically. Eventually some members noticed the
procyclicality. Also, free reserves often moved
opposite to or independently of total reserves,
the money stock, or bank credit.
In November 1960, James Knipe, consultant
to the Chairman, wrote a memo criticizing the
instructions that the FOMC sent to the Desk: “The
directives are cast as such pious expressions of
intent that they convey…almost no meaning…
One gets very little sense of progress from one
meeting to the next, and not much of an account
of what has just been accomplished or what the
Committee believes ought to be accomplished
during the next three weeks” (Knipe, November 14,
1960, p. 6). The memo suggested “some use of
numbers” (p. 6).
A few weeks later, Malcolm Bryan (Atlanta
Fed) wrote to a senior staff member, Woodlief
Thomas: “We can defend the actual policy; what
I am afraid we can’t do is to explain what we mean
by the instructions we give” (Bryan, January 14,
1961). Bryan continued his effort to improve
procedures. In April 1961, he urged the FOMC
to “manage the reserve position…with a great
deal more precision, and with a steadier hand”
(FOMC, Minutes, April 18, 1961, p. 22). Bryan
argued that total reserves should grow at a 3 per-
cent trend rate based on growth of population
and transactions. The figure he presented at the
meeting showed that the growth rate fell below
trend before each of the postwar recessions and
rose above trend during the late stages of econ-
omic expansions. Bryan concluded that “we have
tended to overstay our position of tightness and
to be too tight, and then to overstay our position
of ease and to be too easy” (p. 22).
Governor King supported Bryan and wel-
comed his analysis, but Governor Robertson
wanted more expansion than 3 percent growth.
He argued that the demand for money changed
over time, so he opposed using any “historical
trend line as a strategic objective of policy” (FOMC,
Minutes, May 9, 1961, p. 42). Bryan’s proposal
attracted support from one or two presidents,
but both Martin and Hayes disliked “mechanical
rules” and preferred to rely on judgments made
at the time.
The directive to the Manager usually changed
when policy changed. Although the members dis-
cussed changes in the directive vigorously, they
rarely referred to the directive when commenting
on policy operations. The directive became public
when the Board published its annual report, from
3 to 15 months after the FOMC’s decisions. The
directive’s principal role was to show that the
FOMC responded promptly to changes in the
economy. It did not fully succeed. 
A more substantive problem was the lack 
of continuity and the weak influence of long-
term objectives. Each meeting considered and
responded to the most recent data. The members
did not have a framework to relate current changes
to longer-term developments. Many of the changes
to which they responded were transitory, often
random movements. Martin (and others) recog-
nized that their policy “must be tailored to fit
the shape of a future visible only in dim outline”
(Martin, July 11, 1961, p. 68). They lacked a formal
or common means of doing so. Martin always
remained skeptical about economic models and
model-based forecasts, but he did not propose a
general guideline as a substitute.
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policy guides and the weak connection between
actions and long-term goals. In 1961, Vice Chair-
man Canby Balderston made a long statement
about the lack of procedures for achieving long-
term objectives. He recognized that discussion
loosely related to a long-term objective was sub-
optimal and used the growth rate of total reserves
to illustrate his points. 
The guiding philosophy that I favor for the
Committee’s decision-making is to proceed
steadily, week by week, toward whatever
goal seems appropriate.
[Recently] the Committee may have
changed its objective from a 5 percent
growth rate to a 3 percent growth rate [of
total reserves] without full realization as
to what had happened, and since the last
meeting the implementation of Committee
policy has resulted in a radical departure
even from the lower growth rate. (FOMC,
Minutes, August 22, 1961, pp. 47-48)
Early in 1961, the FOMC considered a memo
suggesting changes in the directive. The memo
started a discussion that continued through the
year. It showed considerable awareness of the need
for change. The discussion had two objectives:
improving control and public relations. Several
members wanted to publish reports of their actions
more frequently. 
As a consequence, the FOMC made the current
instruction to the Manager slightly more explicit
by adding a paragraph to the directive. Members
of the FOMC, at this time, used different measures
or variables to describe the current policy target.
Martin did not attempt to reconcile these differ-
ences, so the Manager (or whoever guided the
Manager) retained control of policy action. The
FOMC did not adopt some of the more explicit
instructions suggested by the staff (Ralph Young,
September 6, 1961). George Clay (Kansas City
Fed) gave the reason: “lack of agreement among
the Committee members” (Clay, November 13,
1961, p. 2).
Alfred Hayes (New York Fed) favored a pro-
posal by Watrous Irons (Dallas Fed) that would
allow FOMC members to comment on a “state-
ment of the general economic policy position of
the Committee as it developed out of the discus-
sion” (Hayes, November 3, 1961, p. 3). The
Secretary of the FOMC and the Manager would
prepare the statement immediately after the meet-
ing. Following a review by the Chairman, mem-
bers would review, approve, dissent, or propose
changes. The statement would appear with the
policy directive in the record for the meeting.
Hayes emphasized that the policy statement
would be short, no more than “three or four sen-
tences to express the main points integral to
current policy” (p. 3). The objective was to give
greater emphasis to goals such as price stability
that could be realized only over time.
Eliot Swan (San Francisco Fed) wrote the
following: “We need some economic analysis of
policy on a fairly current basis, done within the
System, and presented regularly to the public.”
This would give the public a sense “of what the
System is trying to do, how it tried to do it, and
what seems to have been accomplished” (Swan,
November 10, 1961, p. 3). Swan undercut his
proposal by adding that this statement would not
be an official statement endorsed by the FOMC.
George Clay (Kansas City Fed) recognized
one problem with proposals like Swan’s or any
attempt to make the directive more explicit. There
was a “lack of agreement among the Committee
members…[E]fforts to be completely explicit may
make it more difficult to arrive at a consensus. But
a lack of specific directions shifts the responsi-
bility of interpretation to the Trading Desk…
Attempts to be specific also are hampered by the
fact that individual members of the Committee
differ in the measures through which they express
their choices—using free reserves, interest rates,
credit expansion, and other terms that cannot be
interchanged” (Clay, November 13, 1961, p. 2).
A remaining problem was to agree on the
purpose served by the directive and statement of
procedure. Public relations, a public record, and
directions to the Manager received different
weights from each of the members. The more
astute members recognized that any substantive
statement restricted future actions. Several agreed
that procedural rules, such as dealing in bills only
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and can prove to be administratively embarrass-
ing at times” (Deming, November 24, 1961, p. 1).
The problem in writing explicit rules was that
“they may be limiting at times and thus force
hard-to-explain deviations; if they are written so
broadly as to escape these difficulties, they become
almost meaningless” (pp. 1-2). Frederick Deming
(Minneapolis Fed) opposed an explicit target
because the FOMC would have to explain why it
deviated. He insisted that the directive 
could not be couched in terms of a guide or
guides such as free reserves, money sup-
ply, total reserves, federal funds or bill
rates…I simply do not believe that any
one indicator is…good enough to use all
of the time and I fear that should we
attempt to use one (or more) in the direc-
tive itself, we will spend a great deal of
time subsequently trying to explain why
we did not get quite the precise results that
these apparently precise indicators would
imply we sought. I also feel that an attempt
to write directives in specifics would push
uncomfortably close to mechanistic policy-
making. (p. 3)
The letters show clearly that one major pur-
pose that the old flexible and imprecise directive
served was covering up disagreements within
the FOMC. Bryan and Hayes did not agree about
a quantitative target for total reserves, but both
agreed with Irons that the FOMC should maintain
procedural rules. Bryan differed with several of
his colleagues by recognizing the problem that a
vague directive posed. Unlike the majority, he
believed the FOMC would be well served if it
adopted a quantitative target, but he understood
that his proposal did not attract much support.
The discussion at this meeting, many subse-
quent discussions, and failure to adopt a quanti-
tative objective suggest that a majority did not
favor precise instructions and explicit objectives.
One reason is that ambiguity provided opportu-
nities for Martin, Hayes, or the Manager to change
directions. Unambiguous policy objectives and
operating procedures to achieve the objectives
required a commitment to rule-like behavior that
many on the FOMC were not willing to make.12
Martin usually made no comment on more
explicit statements of direction, perhaps because
he recognized that agreement was unlikely.
Once inflation started, the issues changed.
Some members believed that inflation could per-
manently lower the unemployment rate. Others
were more concerned about the temporary
increase in the unemployment rate resulting
from actions to slow inflation. Several accepted
that little could be done as long as the federal
government ran budget deficits. Since there was
no generally accepted framework relating unem-
ployment, inflation, budget deficits, balance of
payments, and Federal Reserve actions, there was
no agreement about a long-term strategy.
The members recognized that they did not
have a common framework. After Sherman Maisel
became a Federal Reserve Governor, in 1965, he
tried to make policymaking more coherent and
systematic (Maisel, 1973). He soon recognized
that there was no basis for agreement; members
told him that they were unlikely to find a common
framework.
The minutes have an occasional remark about
anticipations of inflation. There is little evidence
of a general understanding at the time that antici-
pated inflation raised interest rates. The FOMC
did not distinguish between real and nominal rates
until much later. At the start of the inflation, and
for a long time after, members using nominal
interest rates overestimated the degree of restraint.
Misinterpretation added to the pressures from
President Johnson to keep interest rates from rising.
They also overestimated the expected growth of
output after productivity growth slowed in the
mid-1960s.
One way to avoid responsibility for inflation
was to find some other cause. Much public and
policy discussion blamed labor union demands
for starting inflation, treating these wage demands
as autonomous events and not as a response to
actual and anticipated inflation. Many at the
Federal Reserve and in the administration shared
this view. This led to the use of guideposts for
Meltzer
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL, PART 2 2005 157
12 Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) later showed the advantages of
ambiguous policy directives for policymakers who wanted to
change objectives.wage and price increases. The universal failure
of guideposts and guidelines to prevent inflation
did not quickly change these views. And it did
not remind the proponents that noninflationary
policies would prevent large relative price changes
from affecting the general price level. Lucas (1972)
and Laidler and Parkin (1975) showed that rela-
tive price changes would not cause a sustained
inflation in the absence of actual or anticipated
expansionary policy.
Martin explicitly rejected the idea that policy
could reduce unemployment now and respond
to inflation later, the Phillips curve reasoning
favored by Walter Heller and other members of
the 1964-65 Council of Economic Advisers. The
Kennedy-Johnson tax cut brought this issue to
the front because the Johnson administration
argued that the deficit created by the tax cut was
both desirable and temporary. By approving the
tax cut, Congress knew that the resulting deficit
was not an accident. So did Martin and the Federal
Reserve. Martin believed he had a responsibility
to finance it without a large increase in interest
rates, but he did not accept the analytic argument.
It wasn’t that the Phillips curve was vertical; it
was whether there was a reliable trade-off.
Over the years, we have seen counter-
poised full employment or price stability,
social objectives or financial objectives,
and stagnation or inflation. In the last case
there was even a serious discussion of the
number of percentage points of inflation
we might trade off for a percentage point
increase in our growth rate. The underly-
ing fallacy of this approach is that it
assumes we can concentrate on one major
goal without considering collateral, and
perhaps deleterious, side effects on other
objectives. But we cannot. If we were to
neglect international financial equilibrium,
or price stability, or financial soundness
in our understandable zeal to promote
faster domestic growth, full employment,
or socially desirable programs, we would
be confronted with general failure.
(Martin, February 1, 1963, pp. 10-11)
That statement showed that Martin was aware
of the inflationary (and balance of payments)
consequences of financing the deficit. But he
was under pressure from his own beliefs about
the meaning of independence, from the Council’s
belief in policy coordination, and from President
Johnson’s opposition to higher interest rates.
The Council used its Economic Report of the
President to instruct the Federal Reserve about
proper actions: “It would be self-defeating to
cancel the stimulus of tax reduction by tightening
money” (Council of Economic Advisers, 1964, p.
11). Martin recognized the political pressure to
avoid increasing interest rates before the 1964
election. His early meetings with President
Johnson reinforced his beliefs that Johnson was
a populist who supported his populist views with
the policy coordination arguments he learned
from Heller and others.13
In December 1964, the Federal Reserve raised
the federal funds rate by 0.5 points to 4 percent.
Monetary base growth remained at a 5 to 6 percent
annual rate. By May 1965, annual CPI inflation
rose to 1.75 to 2 percent, the highest sustained
rate since 1958.
The year 1965 was the transition from one of
the best four-year periods in U.S. experience to
years of inflation and slow growth. It was the last
year of strong productivity growth and the first
year of rising inflation. The four-quarter average
rate of increase in the GNP deflator rose from 1.5
to 3 percent. The CPI began the year rising at a 1
percent annual rate. It ended at 2 percent; a 12-
month moving average of the CPI rate of increase
did not fall below 2 percent in any month for the
next 20 years. The unemployment rate fell from
5 percent at the start of the year to 4 percent at
the end.
To administration economists, with their faith
in the Phillips curve, the increase in inflation was
the price paid for lower unemployment. They
were willing to pay the price, reluctant to tighten
policy. Martin and several of his colleagues on
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13 In case Martin forgot, Heller reminded him and urged President
Johnson to do the same. For example, on March 2, Heller sent a
memo to Johnson stating, “Martin’s fears of prospective inflation
seem to be mounting to a fever pitch” (Heller, March 2, 1964). He
urged Johnson to hold a meeting of the Quadriad to increase pressure
on Martin. Arthur Okun quoted Johnson’s comment on interest rates:
“It’s hard for a boy from Texas ever to see high interest rates as a
lesser evil than anything else” (Hargrove and Morley, 1984, p. 274).
 the FOMC held a very different view. They were
more concerned about inflation and the balance
of payments.
Until 1965, the U.S. balance of payments had
improved, and not just because of the visible
capital controls and military purchases at home.
Relative prices shifted to increase U.S. competi-
tive advantage. The beginning of domestic infla-
tion reduced this advantage, leading to a decline
in the current account surplus.
The administration made the first of several
errors. Early in 1965 the President’s economic
report and his other messages announced the
need for further expansion and proposed a reduc-
tion in excise taxes and a “budget that will once
again contribute expansionary force rather than
restrictive pressure” (Council of Economic
Advisers [CEA], 1965, p. 9). This was part of an
ambitious program to achieve “the Great Society”
by increasing funds for poverty programs, welfare,
and training. Monetary policy could contribute
by continuing to twist the yield curve by holding
up short-term interest rates to stem a capital out-
flow, while lowering long-term rates to encourage
domestic expansion (pp. 105-06). The President
also asked for repeal of the 25 percent gold reserve
requirement against deposit liabilities of Reserve
Banks (p. 12).
The administration’s concern for fiscal stim-
ulus came despite a decline in unemployment to
4.8 percent in January 1965 and a reported 7.5
percent annual rate of increase in industrial pro-
duction in 1964, a year with a major automobile
strike. These and other signs of strength should
have suggested that additional stimulus was
unnecessary, but administration economists did
not interpret them that way. Reports of a large
increase in the payments deficit at the end of 1964
gave evidence that the interest equalization tax
had shifted a large part of foreign borrowing to
banking markets not subject to the tax. The first
quarter increase in the deflator, 4.9 percent at an
annual rate, gave a second warning: This was the
largest quarterly increase in eight years. The gold
outflow in January gave an additional warning:
At $263 million, it was twice the amount of gold
sales for all of 1964. Outflows continued in
February and March, reaching a record $832 mil-
lion for the first quarter and $1.664 billion for the
calendar year.14 About half the outflow went to
France.
If the push for additional stimulus was the first
mistake made that year, it was not the last. More
consequential were the efforts in mid-summer to
hide the increase in military spending to support
the Vietnam War and, late in the year, public pres-
sure on the Federal Reserve to prevent any increase
in interest rates. The Federal Reserve chafed under
administration pressure, but it permitted annual
growth of the monetary base to reach 5.9 percent
by December, the highest 12-month growth rate
since early 1952.
The Federal Reserve did very little during the
first half of 1965. Treasury borrowing required
even-keel operations much of the time. That alone
cannot explain the cautious, hesitant response.
Four reasons stand out.
First, Martin wanted the FOMC to reach a
consensus before it acted. He often waited, think-
ing that discussion, events, and perhaps colle-
giality would help form the consensus. But
Governors Mitchell and Robertson persistently
opposed tighter policy. On April 30, Sherman
Maisel, an economics professor from the
University of California at Berkeley, joined the
Board, replacing a banker, Abbot Mills. Maisel
usually voted with Mitchell and Robertson. Later,
after the President appointed Andrew Brimmer
to replace Canby Balderston, Martin was never
certain when he would have a majority of the
seven Board members. He hesitated to act with a
majority of the FOMC if it did not include a
majority of the Board.
Second, and most important, Martin believed
he had a duty to prevent inflation and maintain
the dollar’s value. This belief clashed with his firm
belief that the Federal Reserve was independent
within government. If an elected administration
proposed and Congress approved budget deficits,
the Federal Reserve had to help finance part of
them. He could complain internally, and even
externally, but he did not choose to undermine
decisions of elected officials and legislators.
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International Monetary Fund.
 Third, “policy coordination” added greatly
to the problem. Independence “within the govern-
ment” suggested that monetary, fiscal, and other
administration policies should seek the same
objectives and attach similar weights to employ-
ment, price stability, and the payments deficit.
This did not happen. Martin did not accept the
mistaken idea that policymakers could maintain
a welfare-maximizing inflation rate that lowered
unemployment to the socially desirable minimum.
He expressed much greater concern about infla-
tion and the balance-of-payments deficit than
President Johnson or his advisers. When Douglas
Dillon left the administration, Martin lost a pow-
erful ally inside. He had earlier lost a President
who paid attention to his warnings and acquired
one with entrenched populist views who hated
“high” interest rates (Bernstein, 1996, p. 364).
Policy coordination ensnared Martin in
administration policy. He willingly sacrificed
part of the Federal Reserve’s independence for
the opportunity to be part of the economic “team,”
make his views known to the President, and
coordinate policy actions.15 Inevitably he com-
promised by surrendering some independence
of action to coordinate policies. His offer to resign
in February 1965 possibly reflected recognition
that coordination with President Johnson and
his advisers would be costly to Federal Reserve
independence and to the country. Although he
warned the country about inflation many times,
he accepted reappointment in 1967 and remained
until his term ended in 1970, without implement-
ing the policy actions that he favored to achieve
price stability and protect the gold stock.
President Johnson’s main argument in 1965
was that coordination required Martin to wait
until he announced the 1967 budget estimates in
January 1966, but he refused to give accurate esti-
mates. In November 1965, the working estimate
called for $105 billion of total spending in fiscal
1967. By mid-January, estimated spending had
increased to $106.4 billion for fiscal 1966 and
$112.8 for 1967, but the 1967 estimate assumed
that ordinary spending for the Vietnam War ended
in December 1966. That held defense spending
to $57 billion. Actual spending was $114.8 and
$137.0 billion in fiscal 1966 and 1967, respec-
tively, and defense spending reached $58 and
$71 billion in the two years, respectively (Johnson,
December 20, 1965).
Fourth, and of lesser importance, the Federal
Reserve staff and several of the members denied
for several years that inflation had either begun
or increased. They did not deny the numbers
they saw. Like Gardner Ackley, they gave special
explanations—a relative price theory of the gen-
eral price level—in effect claiming that the rise
in the price level resulted from one-time, transi-
tory changes that they did not expect to repeat.
Later, they added other explanations, especially
that the cause of inflation had changed from the
classic “demand pull” to the new “cost push.”
This reasoning exempted the Federal Reserve
(and other central banks) from responsibility and
suggested that the problem was not monetary.
Governor Sherman Maisel (1973, p. 284) presented
the main idea:
In a period of general stability, a strong
union or a monopolistic or oligopolistic
group of companies may try to increase
their income. If they have enough power,
they can do so even though unemployment
exists elsewhere. It is theoretically possi-
ble that other prices would fall as they
raise their prices, but this is unlikely in
most modern economies, where wages
and prices are too rigid to react to minor
increases in unemployment. In fact, the
opposite occurs. Workers in industries
with somewhat lower demand will strive
for higher wages also…[S]ince profits are
generally not that large, over time any
increase in wages must show up in higher
prices.
The economy had not acted that way in
1961-64. But, even if modern economies acted as
Maisel described, his discussion explains why the
price level would be higher. It does not explain
why prices would continue to increase or increase
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15 During the 1964 expansion with low inflation, Martin told Heller
that he had been wrong to think that the tax cut “would quickly fire
up, not to say overheat the economy.” He offered to “cooperate
with the CEA—he always has…but he was particularly warm and
insistent about it” (Heller, July 17, 1964). 
 at a rising rate. This distinction, between a change
in price or wage level and a maintained rate of
change, hindered clear thinking about inflation.
Sometimes the word meant any price level
increase. Elsewhere it meant a sustained rate of
increase. Since one-time price level increases
often took place over time, it was easy, but mis-
leading, to mix the two.
The sustained rate of price increase could
not continue without an increase in money or its
rate of use (velocity). Maisel recognized that
without an increase in money, cost-push price
increases were limited. He wrote that the principal
reason prices continued to increase was “the
unwillingness, for valid economic and political
reasons, to allow the economy to suffer the nec-
essary recession or depression which would
accompany a policy of not expanding money
because incomes are being pushed up from the
cost side” (p. 25). Then he added a critical sen-
tence: “The level of unemployment required to
stabilize prices…is higher than that which the
economy finds acceptable” (p. 25).
This popular explanation worked with other
features of the Federal Reserve’s approach, such
as coordination, support for deficit finance, and
failure to distinguish between real and nominal
rates. No single person may have held all of these
views. The ideas worked together to start infla-
tion—sustained rates of price increase—and per-
mit it to continue.
The most likely alternative explanation was
not advanced at the time. Once the public learned
that policymakers would act to prevent a rise in
unemployment, they anticipated, correctly as it
turned out, that anti-inflation policy would cease
soon after unemployment started to increase.
This is not to be confused with the vertical, long-
run Phillips curve. It does not invoke a vertical
Phillips curve; it is not inconsistent with that
proposition, but it emphasizes the shifting policy
analyzed in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and
the anticipations induced by the policy.
The FOMC met eight times during the first
half of 1965. It voted twice for “slightly firmer”
policy, on February 2 and March 23. Governors
Mitchell and Robertson opposed both changes,
joined by President Clay (Kansas City Fed) in
March. Free reserves responded to the changes,
but interest rates declined during the first half of
the year. In May, four members of the FOMC dis-
sented; they wanted a tighter policy. Martin did
not support them.
At almost every meeting, there are references
to expanding activity, rising prices, rapid credit
expansion, or an increasing payments deficit.
Difficulties in separating persistent and temporary
changes, such as anticipation of rising prices or
inventory building in anticipation of a steel strike,
reduced the impact of the observations. The
administration put on additional controls to
reduce the foreign payment outflow, supporting
those who wished to put responsibility for the
gold loss on the administration and away from
monetary policy.
The FOMC remained divided during the
spring. The May 25 meeting minutes summarized
Chairman Martin’s policy view: 
His own thinking probably tended in the
direction of the group favoring firming,
although no one could be sure about the
appropriate timing. He was becoming
increasingly worried about both the bal-
ance of payments and the possibility of
domestic inflation. His views were not
firm on either point. (FOMC, Minutes,
May 25, 1965, p. 62)
His colleagues must have been surprised when
he spoke at the Columbia University commence-
ment a week later. His speech compared the econ-
omic situation in 1965 with that of 1928-29. He
pointed to similarities and differences. He did not
claim that the country faced a serious inflation
threat. His concerns were financial weakness and
speculation. The press and stock market specu-
lators emphasized the alleged similarities with
1929, not the differences. Industrial stock prices
fell 5.4 percent in the next five weeks and did not
pass their previous peak for four months.
In the spring, the Treasury was concerned
about a possible slowdown of economic growth.
During the summer, a new problem slowly
emerged. Beginning in July 1965, President
Johnson expanded the resource and financial
commitment to the Vietnam War by announcing
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The President did not let the members of the
Council or Treasury officials know the actual size
of planned spending increases. Martin learned
from Senator Richard Russell, as early as July, that
the budget deficit would be much larger than
Johnson admitted to the Treasury, the Council,
or the Quadriad. “I had better information than
the Treasury had…I went to the President, oh, I’d
say four or five times and laid them out to him”
(Martin, May 8, 1987a, pp. 1-2).
Johnson did not want to reduce spending,
raise tax rates, or have the Federal Reserve raise
interest rates. Martin described the conversation.
He [President Johnson] didn’t want any
increase in rates and he wanted me to
assure him that there wouldn’t be. I
couldn’t do that, of course. I had already
made up my mind that we needed an
increase in rates. So I did my best to break
this to him as gently as possible but wasn’t
so very successful in that he was absolutely
convinced that I was trying to raise the rate
and pull the rug out from under him. I said
“Mr. President you know that I wouldn’t
do that to you even if I could.” He said,
“Well I’m afraid you can.” And I said,
“Well, I want to tell you right now that if
I can [raise the rate] I will, because I think
you’re just on the wrong course. I’ve been
perfectly fair with you. I was over here
early this year.” (Martin, May 8, 1987b,
p. 9)
Despite increases in long-term rates in August
and September, no action followed for several
months. In July, Ellis (Boston Fed) dissented
because he wanted a firmer policy. In late August,
Trieber (New York Fed) did the same. Martin “was
in complete agreement with the consensus…for
no change in policy” (FOMC, Minutes, August
31, 1965, p. 68). Hayes argued for a tighter policy
in September, including a discount rate increase.
Balderston, Shephardson, and Ellis (Boston Fed)
favored a discount rate increase after the Treasury
completed its financing. Martin did not think the
timing was right. The vote was nine to three for
no change. Maisel, Mitchell, and Robertson dis-
sented because interest rates had increased despite
a policy of no change. They wanted policy to ease
to roll back the increase.
At a Quadriad meeting early in October,
Ackley and Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler
urged Martin to delay any increase in interest
rates until the evidence was clearer. Ackley pro-
posed waiting until January, when the new budget
data became available. Fowler argued that “risks
of tightening are greater than the risks of over-
staying present policies.” He called the danger
of overheating “tenuous,” and he wanted the
administration to oppose changes in the prime
rate (Fowler, October 6, 1965, pp. 1-2).
Martin’s memo for the Quadriad meeting tried
to shift discussion from interest rates to credit
growth. He noted that Regulation Q ceiling rates
caused credit to flow outside the banking system,
and he warned of “rising expectations, evidenced
in financial markets and real investment.” A slight
increase in interest rates would help to extend
the expansion and improve the balance of pay-
ments (Martin, October 6, 1965).
Martin’s views did not prevail. A week later
at the FOMC, he read his memo to the President.
FOMC members split. Some agreed with Martin
but wanted to wait for the Treasury to complete
its financing. Others opposed because they saw
no sign of inflation. Faced with a divided Com-
mittee and administration opposition, Martin
not only did not insist, but voted against an
increase. After warning the Committee about the
danger of waiting too long, he explained why the
FOMC should not change policy.
As Chairman, he had the responsibility for
maintaining System relations within the
Government—for getting the thinking of
the President and members of the Admin-
istration, and for apprising them of the
thinking within the Committee—and he
had made that one of his principal con-
cerns during the fourteen years he had
held his present office. Last week he had
given the President a paper expressing his
personal views…[H]e had talked with the
Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers, with Treasury officials, and with
the President. They had all expressed the
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monetary policy now. The President had
not taken a rigid position on the matter—
he had not suggested that the Committee
should abdicate its responsibility for
formulating monetary policy…At the
moment, however, the Administration was
strongly opposed to a change in policy.…
With a divided Committee and in the face
of strong Administration opposition he
did not believe it would be appropriate
for him to lend his support to those who
favored a change in policy now. (FOMC,
Minutes, October 12, 1965, pp. 68-69)
The President was not much concerned about
Martin’s warnings about spending and the deficit.
He spent much of the fall of 1965 pushing enact-
ment of new spending programs for education
and the environment (Califano, 2000, pp. 70, 81).
Apparently, policy coordination worked only in
one direction.
In September, Martin had agreed to let the
Federal Reserve staff participate in a joint effort
with the staffs of the other Quadriad members to
study where the economy was headed. The report
in November concluded that the Federal Reserve
“should not tighten for the remainder of the year”
and should reconsider action when the budget
and GNP estimate for 1966 became known16
(Okun, p. 24). Monetary tightening should wait
for GNP to reach $720 billion, a 5 percent increase
from 1965 and almost 2 percentage points above
the standard forecast (p. 24).
Martin knew that the budget estimates under-
stated the increase in defense spending and that
Johnson had suppressed the planned increase.
He knew also that contrary to standard practice,
the Budget Bureau would not discuss the budget-
ary projections with him or his staff. Martin dis-
trusted President Johnson and was inclined to give
more attention to markets than to economists’
forecasts. Government bond yields began to rise in
August and had increased 20 basis points by mid-
November to the highest level since 1960. This
was a large increase by the standards of the time.
On November 4, the Treasury’s issue of 18-
month 4.25 percent notes was not well received,
allegedly because of concerns about increased
spending for Vietnam. Between August 1 and
December 1, yields on 3- to 5-year Treasury issues
rose 42 basis points to 4.52 percent (Board of
Governors [BOG], 1965, p. 190). In the month of
November, the System bought $5.5 billion of 1-
to 5-year securities, mainly the new note issues,
and sold Treasury bills or let them run off.
The market had signaled that interest rates
should rise. With a few brief exceptions, the fed-
eral funds rate had remained above the discount
rate since March. Data available at the time
showed rapid growth in the monetary aggregates.
Martin had another source warning about
inflation: the Federal Advisory Council (FAC),
12 bankers with statutory responsibility for advis-
ing the Board. Members explained the strength
of investment spending as an attempt to substi-
tute capital for rising labor costs (BOG, Minutes,
September 21, 1965, p. 3). In November, the FAC
repeated its September warning: “The Council is
concerned with increasing evidence of the devel-
opment of inflationary pressures, the continued
strong demand for bank loans…Consequently,
we believe the Board should be prepared to move
in the direction of further restraint, including a
tightening of reserves and an increase in the dis-
count rate” (BOG, Minutes, November 16, 1965,
p. 22). 
Martin was, finally, ready to accept the chal-
lenge despite continued opposition from the
administration. His reason was to show independ-
ence, not to reduce growth of credit and money.
At the FOMC meeting on November 23, the staff
proposed that if the FOMC tightened policy, it
should reduce reserve growth and keep Regulation
Q ceiling rates unchanged. This would force a
reduction in CDs and bank credit. Hayes proposed
the opposite, an increase in ceiling rates and the
discount rate (Maisel, Diary, December 3, 1965,
pp. 3-4). Nine of the twelve presidents either
opposed a discount rate increase or wanted to
wait. Martin said the market’s “expectations were
just as much that the President would not allow
any interest rate changes as to the contrary”
(FOMC, Minutes, November 23, 1965, p. 84). “He
16 Martin did not share the report with Board members. We could
not find a copy in the Board’s archives.
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the interest rates from domination by the President
and he was more interested in this than he was
in tightening the amount of money” (Maisel, Diary,
December 3, 1965, p. 15). He opposed an increase
in reserve requirement ratios because he did not
want to reduce availability. His aim was to show
that the System had not yielded to the adminis-
tration (Maisel, Diary, January 18, 1966, pp. 2-3).
Maisel warned Ackley that the discount rate
would increase. Martin had already told him. The
President was at his ranch in Texas recovering
from a gall bladder operation. On November 29,
the President’s assistant relayed an urgent telegram
from Ackley to the President in Texas warning
that Martin intended to approve a discount rate
increase the following week. The telegram quoted
Maisel as urging the President to tell Governor
Daane to oppose any increase until January
(Califano, November 29, 1965). A few days later,
Ackley followed with a memo claiming that he
had failed to distinguish between real and nominal
interest rates, but he argued that the voluntary
restraint program on bank lending to foreigners
was an effective substitute for higher interest rates
in reducing the capital outflow. The President
responded by inviting the Quadriad to his ranch
the following Monday.
Martin decided to act before the Texas meeting.
On December 3, the Board voted four to three to
raise the discount rate at New York and Chicago.
In the next ten days, all Reserve banks adopted
the 4.5 percent rate. Robertson, Mitchell, and
Maisel dissented. Dewey Daane cast the swing
vote supporting the increase. Following the vote,
the Board voted to increase Regulation Q ceiling
rates to 5.5 percent.
The opponents used a number of arguments.
Robertson said that inflation was not inevitable.
Higher rates might bring on recession and would
raise the cost to the Treasury of marketing its debt
in January (BOG, Minutes, December 3, 1965, p. 2).
Robertson proposed instead to (i) slow the issue
of (unregulated) bank promissory notes by making
them subject to Regulation Q ceiling rates and (ii)
allow banks to borrow reserves to cover the loss
of time deposits because Regulation Q ceiling
rates were below market rates. Reminiscent of
the Riefler-Burgess doctrine, he explained that
increased member bank borrowing “should serve
to moderate somewhat the rate of advance in
bank credit” (BOG, Minutes, December 3, 1965,
p. 3). He also opposed increasing Regulation Q
ceiling rates.
Mitchell did not agree. He opposed the
increase in the discount rate on political grounds.
The Federal Reserve “appeared to be on a colli-
sion course with the administration” (p. 7). He
preferred to negotiate a 0.25-percentage-point
increase with the administration, but he favored
an increase in ceiling rates and would support a
5.5 percent ceiling rate on all maturities over 15
days (p. 9).
The recovery was Maisel’s main concern, but
he also believed they should wait for the Presi-
dent’s budget in mid-January. He favored incomes
policy to control prices and wages. “A discount
rate increase…could be interpreted only as a vote
of no-confidence by this Board in the national
goal of growth at full employment” (p. 16).
Neglecting 2 percent inflation, he warned the
Board that the discount rate at New York had not
been as high as 4.5 percent since November 1929
(p. 17). He dismissed current concerns about infla-
tion. If inflation rose, the Board could act later.
The winning coalition was in place. Dewey
Daane made the case for higher rates, based on
persistent price pressures, the risk of more general
price increases, and the prospect that an invest-
ment boom had started. He mentioned a 10 percent
increase in business fixed investment as especially
troublesome. He added that he worried about
“deterioration in our balance of payments not
entirely papered over by changing definitions
and some strenuous Governmental efforts to
achieve postponement of some scheduled out-
flows into next year’s statistics” (p. 11). Then he
added that higher interest rates “will contribute
to the relative price stability essential to the even-
tual resolution of our balance of payments prob-
lem” (p. 11). 
Martin spoke last. He warned about the risk
to the System’s independence if it acted against
the President’s wishes. “There is a question
whether the Federal Reserve is to be run by the
administration in office” (p. 28).
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it wanted to slow excessive demands for credit
and maintain price stability. A news story describ-
ing the action said, “The Federal Reserve has no
intention of imposing a severe ‘tight money’ policy
that would render bank loans difficult to get”
(New York Times, December 6, 1965, p. 6).
Nevertheless, President Johnson criticized the
decision, publicly expressing his view that it
would hurt consumers and state and local govern-
ments and complaining that “the decision on
interest rates should be a coordinated policy deci-
sion in January” (p. 31). The New York Times
editorial supported the President on coordination
while recognizing that inflationary pressures had
increased and the administration had restricted
its efforts to pressuring industries and firms not
to raise prices (p. 36).
Gardner Ackley, the Council’s chairman, used
more pointed language (Ackley, p. 3). But Ackley’s
concern was as much about the breakdown of
policy coordination as about the increase in
interest rates. 
The members of the Council were not
entirely unsympathetic with Martin’s posi-
tion. We agreed that some kind of restraint
was necessary. We would have much pre-
ferred a tax increase rather than tighter
money. We not only clearly predicted to
the President that monetary policy would
tighten considerably farther, but I suppose
in a sense we also had a certain amount of
sympathy with what the Fed was doing,
although we didn’t always express that
sympathy strongly or clearly in the
President’s presence. (p. 4)
Later, Ackley described policy development
under the pressure of war finance as he saw it.
Johnson opposed any reduction in spending on
his Great Society programs. He disliked higher
interest rates. That left a tax increase to pay for
rising costs of war and the Great Society programs.
By October, Ackley claimed that the Council knew
about spending increases. 
It is frequently assumed that at this period
the Council of Economic Advisers and
perhaps other people were misinformed
about some of the facts…about the size of
prospective government expenditures…
[W]e had all the evidence we needed to
conclude without any question, certainly
by November or early December, that a tax
increase was absolutely necessary if we
were going to avoid substantial inflation
in 1966. So the proposal for a tax increase
was well formulated and strongly sup-
ported by Treasury, Council, and Budget
Bureau in the late fall and throughout this
period. (Hargrove and Morley, 1984, pp.
247-48)17
Some of the President’s advisers claimed
that if Martin had not raised the discount rate,
the President might have asked for a tax increase
early in 1966 (Okun, p. 25). Dewey Daane
explained, however, that Martin knew Wilbur
Mills (Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee) well and “never had any sense that
there was the slightest possibility of a tax increase
from LBJ” (Hargrove and Morley, 1984, p. 252).
Johnson (1971, pp. 444-45) confirms this. For
Martin, coordination had become a one-way street;
the Federal Reserve supported administration
policies but had no support for its own concerns.18
The President had refused to confirm what Martin
knew about the budget. Inflation had started to
increase, and the market people, whose judgments
Martin relied on more than economists’ forecasts,
saw this in the large increase in lending to finance
war production. He took a temporary respite from
coordinated policy.
The discount rate increase raised criticisms
of Martin and the Federal Reserve out of propor-
tion to the steps they had taken. Congressman
17 Ackley’s memos in the Johnson library do not support his claim
or his recollection about timing. His recommendation appears in
a December 17 memo, two weeks after the rate increase.
18 It was not just the President. Ackley claimed that he liked Martin,
but he did not respect him or his opinions. “Martin was absolutely
zero as an economist. He had no real understanding of economics”
(Ackley, p. 6). Heller, who continued to advise Johnson after he left
the Council, regarded coordination as a way of influencing, possibly
controlling, the Federal Reserve’s actions. Ackley did not believe
the Federal Reserve should be independent: “I would do everything
I could to reduce or eliminate the independence of the Federal
Reserve” (p. 6). This attitude, whether or not expressed openly,
was unlikely to make Martin believe that the relation was one of
equals coordinating their actions.
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power. Senator Paul Douglas (Illinois) called the
action “as brutal as it was impolite,” and Senator
William Proxmire (Wisconsin) said it was a blun-
der and demanded hearings (New York Times,
December 7, 1965, pp. 1, 74).
The press report of the meeting at the ranch
suggested that Johnson and Martin had a differ-
ence of opinion, but the “atmosphere [at the press
conference] was suffused with sweetness” (p. 1).
Martin’s account of the meeting was entirely differ-
ent. Johnson accused him of taking advantage of
his illness and harming his presidency. “He was
very disagreeable” (Martin, 1987b, p. 14). But
Martin did not yield, even when Johnson swore
at him. Martin’s account explains why his efforts
to coordinate delayed action, despite his June
speech and his many warnings about inflation.
The rate increases remained in effect. Under
intense pressure, Martin courageously maintained
the Federal Reserve’s right to independent action,
but the action did not stop inflation or slow growth
of the monetary base. The monetary base and M1
continued to increase rapidly as the Federal
Reserve attempted to moderate the impact on
market rates. 
Martin had not raised the discount rate to
reduce money growth. At the first FOMC meeting
after the discount rate increase, his concern was
the shock to the market from the increases in dis-
count and Regulation Q ceiling rates. The FOMC
agreed. Part of the market’s uncertainty probably
came from growing recognition that inflation had
returned (Maisel, Diary, Summary, February 9,
1967).19 The directive called for moderating the
market’s turbulence.
Instead of a restrictive policy to stop inflation,
“credit was supplied between December and the
end of June at record-breaking rates. The rate of
increase in total reserves from December through
June was at a 6.3 percent annual rate. This was
four times as large as the June-November 1965
period. All other aggregate measures showed
similar rates of increase” (p. 1).
Those who voted for the discount rate increase
argued for minor restriction of credit; those who
voted against the increase recognized that the
administration had left the problem to the Federal
Reserve. Although they believed that fiscal
restraint was the preferred policy, they saw that
it was not about to happen. They argued for more
monetary restriction, citing the growth of the
aggregates as evidence of the need for restraint
(p. 3). Martin and other proponents of moderation
relied instead on the decline in free reserves and
the rise in the federal funds rate and other short-
term rates. They believed that policy tightened.20
By March, long-term Treasury yields reached
4.7 percent, a 0.35-percentage-point increase after
the discount rate increase, and the federal funds
rate reached 4.63 percent, a 0.5-percentage-point
increase. Member bank borrowing increased, and
free reserves reached –$255 million in March
(from $8 million in December). As on many other
occasions, free reserves and interest rates misled
the majority of the FOMC. 
Governor Maisel (1973) drew a similar con-
clusion. “Federal Reserve doctrine was based on
a money market strategy. The Fed used money
market conditions simultaneously as a target, or
measure, of monetary policy and as a guide for
the manager” (p. 78). Referring to his introduction
to FOMC procedures, Maisel wrote, “Nowhere did
I find an account of how monetary policy was
made or how it operated…Arguments had been
strong and quite clear [in 1965] because they were
based primarily on ideological views…Frequently,
members of the FOMC argued over the merits of
policy without ever having arrived at a meeting
of the minds as to what monetary policy was and
how it worked” (pp. 77-78). 
The absence of a relevant, coherent framework
proved costly. By March 1966, the 12-month rate
of increase in the CPI reached 2.8 percent, the
highest rate in eight years. The Great Inflation
had started.
Arthur F. Burns became Chairman of the
Board of Governors in February 1970. He was
the first economist to hold that position. A close
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19 Maisel did not start keeping a diary at each meeting, although he
took notes. The February 9, 1967, summary covers some meetings
from December 1965 to October 1966. The text is based on notes
made at the meetings. I am extremely grateful to Sherman Maisel
for making his diary available to me.
20 Maisel (1973, pp. 83-85) gives a full account of the arguments at the
February 1966 meeting. He documents the misleading interpretation
of a decline in free reserves as evidence that policy had become
more restrictive despite the large increase in total reserves.
 associate of President Nixon, he served as an
adviser on many nonmonetary issues during his
term as Chairman, and he infuriated the President
in 1970-71 by calling publicly and frequently for
a wage-price review board to control inflation.
At first, Burns agreed to the administration’s
gradualist approach to slowly lower inflation with
very little increase in unemployment. By the time
he became Chairman, however, the economy was
in recession, with the unemployment rate well
above the acceptable 4.5 percent that the gradual-
ist policy hoped to keep as a maximum. Burns
persuaded the FOMC to adopt a more expansive
policy despite the 6 percent CPI inflation rate. For
the second time, the Federal Reserve retreated
from an anti-inflation policy. This reinforced the
expectation that inflation would not decline over
time.
Using reasoning different from that of Ackley,
Okun, or Martin, Burns reached the same policy
conclusion. There is much more to the monetary
history of the 1970s than this paper can present.
Burns’s decision to ease policy at his very first
meeting tells us much about the ordering of his
priorities. Burns’s Per Jacobsson lecture explains
his reasoning, his interpretation of the vague guide-
line in the 1946 Employment Act, and the weights
he applied to inflation and unemployment.
“Maximum” or “full” employment, after
all, had become the nation’s major econ-
omic goal—not stability of the price level…
Even conservative politicians and busi-
nessmen began echoing Keynesian teach-
ings. It therefore seemed only natural to
federal officials charged with economic
responsibilities to respond quickly to any
slackening of economic activity…but to
proceed very slowly and cautiously in
responding to evidence of increasing pres-
sure on the nation’s resources of labor and
capital. Fear of immediate unemploy-
ment—rather than fear of current or even-
tual inflation—thus came to dominate
economic policymaking. (Burns, 1987,
p. 691)
Missing from Burns’s statement and from the
rest of his lecture is any reference to the independ-
ence of the central bank. Policy coordination
and central bank independence were in conflict.
As many central banks learned from the 1970s
experience, the conflict arose from the difference
in the weights they must assign to inflation and
employment if their countries are to realize both
high employment and low inflation. Politicians
elected for four- or five-year terms put much more
weight on employment—jobs, jobs, jobs—than
on a future inflation. Central bankers are given
longer terms and operational independence to
increase the weight they place on longer-term con-
sequences of policy actions; the Federal Reserve
failed to do so. Inflation fell after the Federal
Reserve abandoned coordination and accepted
its responsibility to maintain the value of money.
Once the public became convinced that the
Federal Reserve would persist despite unemploy-
ment rates above 10 percent and short-term inter-
est rates near 20 percent, anticipations changed.
That took until 1984-85, the year when 10-year
Treasury bonds reached a peak (13.8 percent).
The economy had recovered with annual CPI
inflation at 4 percent or less.
This outcome, in broad outline, would not
have surprised Arthur Burns. He recognized that
[v]iewed in the abstract, the Federal
Reserve System had the power to abort the
inflation at its incipient stage fifteen years
ago [1964] or at any later point, and it has
the power to end it today [1979]. At any
time within that period, it could have
restricted the money supply and created
sufficient strains in financial and indus-
trial markets to terminate inflation with
little delay. It did not do so because the
Federal Reserve was itself caught up in the
philosophic and political currents that
were transforming American life and
culture. (Burns, 1987, p. 692; emphasis
added)
Burns does not appeal to mistakes, bad luck,
or misinformation. He appeals to philosophical
and political beliefs.21 Unlike Martin, who had
21 Burns recognizes “errors of economic or financial judgment,”
calls them significant, and cites the consensus view in the 1960s
and early 1970s that “an unemployment rate of about 4 percent
corresponded to a practical condition of full employment” (Burns,
1987, p. 693). 
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done, Burns knew “in the abstract” what was
required. He was unwilling, or believed the Federal
Reserve would be unable, to carry through an
anti-inflation program that imposed heavy costs.
He dismissed gradualism that spread the costs
over five years or more as unlikely to succeed.
[T]he very caution that leads politically to
a policy of gradualism may well lead also
to its premature suspension or abandon-
ment in actual practice…That has hap-
pened in the past, and it may happen
again. (p. 697)
Lacking a political consensus, Burns allowed
inflation to continue and increase. And he erred
in treating the 1973-74 oil shocks as a recession
that called for more stimulus. That error, too,
brought higher inflation.
CONCLUSION
Martin’s beliefs, the absence of a relevant
theory, errors, and institutional arrangements
explain why inflation started. The first two even-
tually changed, but inflation continued, so the
reasons inflation continued are separate from the
reasons it started. Two main institutional arrange-
ments contributed to inflation in the 1960s.
First, even-keel policy caused the Federal
Reserve to delay taking appropriate policy action,
sometimes for months. During even-keel periods,
usually lasting for two to four weeks, the Federal
Reserve often permitted large increases in reserve
growth that it did not subsequently remove. It is,
of course, true that the System could have pre-
vented the inflationary impact. The Treasury failed
to do so because the cost of reducing reserves (or
reserve growth) always seemed large. It could
have eliminated even-keel policy by auctioning
securities, as it eventually did.
Years later, Chairman Arthur Burns accepted
the importance of even-keel policies for the begin-
ning and continuation of inflation.
While the Federal Reserve always would
accommodate the Treasury up to a point,
the charge could be made—and was being
made—that the System had accommo-
dated the Treasury to an excessive degree.
Although he was not a monetarist, he
found a basic and inescapable truth in
the monetarist position that inflation
could not have persisted over a long
period of time without a highly accom-
modative monetary policy. (FOMC,
Minutes, March 19, 1974, pp. 111-12)
Second, Martin’s acceptance of policy coor-
dination with the administration prevented the
Federal Reserve from taking timely actions and
contributed to more expansive policies than were
consistent with price stability. The System delayed
acting in 1965 despite Martin’s early warnings
about inflation, and it eased policy in 1968 to
coordinate with fiscal restriction. Despite well-
known arguments from the permanent-income
hypothesis, Arthur Okun and the Board’s staff
expressed concern about fiscal overkill. Martin
had promised President Johnson that passage of
the temporary tax surcharge would lower interest
rates. The Board moved to ease policy by encour-
aging reductions in the discount rate against the
wishes of most of the Reserve Bank presidents.
Output continued to rise and unemployment to
fall. By December, the annual rate of CPI increase
was 4.6 percent, 1.8 percentage points higher
than a year earlier. The unemployment rate was
3.4 percent, the lowest since 1951-53. Monetary
base growth for the year reached 7.15 percent.
Martin said: “[T]he horse of inflation not only was
out of the barn, but was already well down the
road” (FOMC, Minutes, December 12, 1967, p. 98).
Martin acknowledged the error in easing
policy. Reversing the error proved costly. As Okun
eventually recognized, we could not “get back to
where we were in 1965, the good old days…That’s
exactly what we thought would happen. That’s
exactly what didn’t happen” (Hargrove and
Morley, 1984, p. 308).
The Nixon administration had a different
analytic framework. It accepted the vertical long-
run Phillips curve and paid attention to money
growth. It chose a gradualist policy and, in its
internal memos, was willing to tolerate an unem-
ployment rate as high as 4.5 percent. By the end
of the 1969-70 recession, the unemployment rate
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5.4 percent.
Administration economists urged faster money
growth to reduce unemployment. Arthur Burns,
the new Chairman of the Board of Governors, con-
vinced himself that inflation could not be reduced
at a politically acceptable unemployment rate.
He told President Nixon that “Wage and price
decisions are now being made on the assumption
that governmental policy will move promptly
to check a sluggish economy” (Burns, June 22,
1971, p. 2). He also blamed cost-push factors,
the power of labor unions, and welfare programs,
along with expectations that inflation would per-
sist. He favored controls or guideposts to break
expectations. As the 1972 election approached,
President Nixon accepted that advice. The admin-
istration chose political benefit over economic
fundamentals.
Inflation continued because of the unwilling-
ness of policymakers to persist in a political and
socially costly policy of disinflation. During the
1960s and after, there was little political support
for an anti-inflation policy in Congress and none
in the administration if it required unemployment
much above 4 percent. Polling data show that
inflation was not named by many people as “the
most important problem facing the country.” The
number of respondents who considered inflation
to be the most important problem never went
above 14 percent. And during the 1970s, that per-
centage was always lower. Often, inflation came
fourth or fifth on the list of most important prob-
lems.22 Without political support, the Federal
Reserve was back in a position similar to that of
1946-50. It had greater independence on paper;
it had not committed to maintain interest rates at
or below a fixed ceiling as in 1942-50. The unem-
ployment rate functioned in much the same way,
however. It limited the extent to which the System
could persist in a policy to end inflation or reduce
it permanently. Soon after unemployment rose, the
administration and the Federal Reserve shifted
their operations and goal from lowering inflation
to avoiding or ending recession and restoring full
employment.
Andrew Brimmer, a Board member from
1966 to 1974, explained that employment was
the principal goal: “Fighting inflation, checking
inflation was the second priority” (Brimmer, 2002,
p. 22). No one ever took an explicit vote to order
these priorities, but the decisions taken at critical
times support Brimmer’s interpretation.
Reversals had lasting effects. Inflation fell
quickly in 1966-67, without a recession but with
major disruption of the housing market and stri-
dent opposition from the politically powerful
thrift industry. The public learned from this
attempt to reduce inflation that anti-inflation
actions did not last once unemployment (or other
costs) started to rise. The policy focus then shifted,
reinforcing the public’s growing belief that infla-
tion would continue and even increase. These
beliefs made it harder for the Federal Reserve to
persuade the public that it would persist with
anti-inflation actions the next time it tried.
The next time was 1969-70. A new adminis-
tration was in power. The principal economic
policymakers did not subscribe to the idea of a
permanent trade-off between unemployment
and inflation. They accepted the logic of Milton
Friedman’s (1968) analysis showing that any
reduction in unemployment achieved by increas-
ing inflation was temporary. It persisted only as
long as the inflation was unanticipated. But, the
public and Congress were unwilling to accept
the temporary increase in unemployment that
would substantially lower or end inflation.
Officials learned subsequently that, by refusing
to pay the costs of transition to lower inflation,
they increased the costs they would face subse-
quently by reinforcing beliefs that the public
held.23 They called this mixture of inflation and
unemployment “stagflation” and found it puzzling
and mysterious because they ignored the antici-
pations that the policy actions fostered.
23 I suspect that at least some of them would have paid these costs if
they would not go on too long. By the time they generally recognized
that their policy was working very slowly, the presidential election
was less than two years away. President Nixon was not inclined
to sacrifice his second term to end inflation and probably not con-
vinced that his advisers and the Federal Reserve could deliver. He
believed that he lost the 1960 election because of rising unemploy-
ment and had no interest in repeating the experience.
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22 I am greatly indebted to Karlyn Bowman of the American
Enterprise Institute for retrieving the Gallup data.
 Once inflation became entrenched, it required
a more persistent commitment to end it. Martin,
the Federal Reserve, and administration econo-
mists were aware of the cost paid to end a modest
inflation after 1958. After four years of stable
prices, why did they let inflation continue after
it returned?
Bad luck contributed. Growth of output
slowed after 1966, just as the money growth rate
increased. Many officials continued to believe
that higher growth would return. Other beliefs
played a larger role. Some of the same factors
that contributed to the start also contributed to
persistence. Until the Treasury began to auction
notes and bonds after 1970, even-keel operations
contributed to inflation and made disinflation
difficult.24 George Mitchell, a member of the
Board from 1961 to 1976, told Congress that if
the Treasury sold short-term debt to the banking
system “we have to supply reserves to the bank-
ing system…The success of this operation depends
on how much pressure the banking system is
under. If it is not under much pressure, it would
continue to hold the securities and therefore the
money supply would rise” (Joint Economic Com-
mittee, 1968b, p. 134). He did not say that if banks
were under pressure they would sell the securities
and make loans.
At the same hearing, Senators tried to get the
Federal Reserve to control money growth within
a range of 2 to 5 percent. Mitchell denied that
money growth was excessive.
Senator [Jack] Miller. I have heard criti-
cisms of the Federal Reserve Board for
being responsible for the inflation, as a
result of the excessive expansion of the
money supply…
Mr. Mitchell…Our conviction is that we
have not overused this tool.
Senator Miller. If you have not overused
the tool, then where does the inflation
come from?…
Mr. Mitchell. I think it really comes from
the government deficit. (p. 135)
Later in the same hearing, Senator William
Proxmire questioned Mitchell about the pro-
cyclical behavior of the money stock, citing
declines in four postwar recessions. Mitchell
would not accept the conclusion (p. 140). Martin,
like Mitchell and many others, claimed that
budget deficits were the principal cause of infla-
tion. At times, the statement of this belief suggests
that the inflationary effect of the deficit depends
only on the size of the deficit and is independent
of deficit finance and money growth. Experience
in the 1960s and 1980s can be looked on as an
experiment that tests this proposition in a simple,
direct way. The much smaller budget deficits of
the 1960s occurred with rising inflation rates,
and the larger deficits of the 1980s accompanied
falling inflation rates. A major difference was
that the Federal Reserve did not believe it was
obliged to finance the 1980s deficits, and it did
not do so. Neglecting or ignoring the effects of
policy actions on money growth and inflation
was a major error in the 1960s and 1970s.
Federal Reserve decisions in the Martin era
were made every three weeks. Much time was
spent on what had happened or what might hap-
pen before the next meeting. There is no evidence
that the Board or the FOMC had an organized
way of thinking about the more distant future, as
senior staff recognized (Axilrod, 1970; Pierce,
1980; and Lombra and Moran, 1980). Until 1965-
66, Chairman Martin followed the Riefler rule
that prohibited forecasts. When forecasts began,
they often had large errors, discrediting them.
Also, the members of the Board and the FOMC
did not have a common framework or way of
thinking about monetary policy. Neither Martin
nor Burns made any effort to develop an agreed-
upon way of thinking about how their actions
influenced prices, employment, and the balance
of payments. Sherman Maisel argued frequently
for a more systematic approach, without much
success. The members did not agree on elemen-
tary propositions.
Even if these problems had been resolved
and a common framework developed, as Burns
(1987) notes, the absence of political and popular
support would likely have prevented the System
from continuing decisive action. A more appro-
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24 Brimmer (2002, pp. 25-26) did not recall any discussion about
changing even-keel policy.
 priate, common framework would have avoided
the error in 1968, when the Federal Reserve eased
policy and increased the inflation rate, because
it accepted the Keynesian claim that the tempo-
rary surtax was “fiscal overkill.” But it is also true
that the Johnson administration and the Federal
Reserve were willing to undertake anti-inflation
monetary policy only after the 1968 election.
Martin believed he could maintain Federal
Reserve independence while coordinating policy
actions with the administration. Although he
warned about inflation in 1965, he encouraged
no action against it until late in the year because
he hoped that President Johnson would raise tax
rates instead. Three years later, he eased policy
to offset the surtax, a step that he later recognized
as an error. Some of his senior staff agreed.25
Martin was not alone in these errors. He had
the support of most of his Board and much of the
academic profession. He made little effort to lead
the Federal Reserve away from the coordinated
policy. And there is no evidence of coordination
working in the opposite direction—administration
policy adjusting to support the Federal Reserve’s
responsibility for inflation.26
Policy coordination was not the only error in
1968. Administration and Federal Reserve fore-
casts attributed a powerful effect to the $10 billion
temporary tax surcharge. They could have known
better. Economic analysis had established that
the main effect of a temporary surcharge would
be on saving. Franco Modigliani testified to that
effect a month before the surcharge passed.
If the people know that taxes are going to
be put up for just 3 or 6 months, chances
are that there would be little change in
their consumption because they would
look forward to being able to recoup later.
Therefore, I think attention should be given
to finding measures that have the right
incentives. (Modigliani, 1968, p. 63)
Partly as a consequence of policy coordination,
but also in response to political and public pres-
sure, the Federal Reserve accepted responsibility
for housing and income distribution. Although it
could not do much about the latter except to reduce
reserve requirements for small banks, it moder-
ated its actions to prevent sharp reductions in
homebuilding. Adding homebuilding to a list of
objectives that included sustained growth, full
employment, low inflation, and international
balance almost ensured failure to meet most or
all of the objectives.
When Burns replaced Martin, President Nixon
recognized the independence of the Federal
Reserve and then added, “I respect his independ-
ence. However, I hope that independently he
will conclude that my views are the ones he should
follow” (Wells, 1994, p. 41).
This was a forecast of the pressure the Presi-
dent and his advisers kept up. Burns, like Marriner
Eccles before him, wanted to be a key presidential
adviser while he was Chairman. Possibly to satisfy
the President’s pressures for lower unemployment
or because he shared the President’s priority,
Burns maintained relatively high money growth
and in 1970-71 frequently and forcefully argued
for a wage-price board to slow inflation by exhor-
tation. More likely, as he claimed repeatedly, he
believed that monetary policy could not reduce
inflation. His Per Jacobsson lecture (Burns, 1987),
from which I quoted, shows that he recognized
that the inflation was the result of overly expan-
sive monetary policy but there was little support
in the administration, Congress, or the general
public for the consequences of the policy that
would be required.
Burns resented White House interference and
pressure, but he did not often resist it. He took
over a Board most of whose members had been
appointed by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.
To varying degrees, a majority preferred to con-
tinue inflation rather than increase unemployment.
If inflation could be reduced at an unemployment
rate of 4.25 or 4.50 percent, they would accept it.
25 “Question: Do you think it was a mistake for the Fed to be that
closely involved in administration policy? Answer: Yes, because
you become less objective” (Axilrod, 1997, pp. 17-18).
26 The House Banking Committee asked economists and policy offi-
cials for their opinions on mandating policy coordination, a policy
rule, or the present regime. Replies came from 69 respondents. Most
(42) favored a coordinated program; 13 favored a monetary rule of
some kind; 14 favored no change. I interpret that to mean that the
group members did not oppose coordination but did not want it
made mandatory. Chairman Okun of the Council of Economic
Advisers voted for mandatory coordination. Chairman Martin
and Secretary Fowler voted for the status quo (Joint Economic
Committee, 1968a, p. 8).
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rate. There was a minority that wanted more
restrictive policy and more action against inflation.
The few consistent anti-inflationists, such as
Hayes, Brimmer, and Francis, were exceptions.
They gained support when inflation rose, but only
until unemployment rose above the level the
majority would accept. Brimmer (2002, p. 23)
explained at the time that if fiscal policy was the
way it was, you would have to tighten monetary
policy to the point of inducing a recession. He
added that the Federal Reserve “didn’t promise a
tradeoff [of easier monetary policy]…if you get a
tax bill but we came pretty close to it” (p. 23).
Many other reasons have been used to explain
the persistence of inflation: The use of money
market targets, failure to distinguish between
real and nominal interest rates, and neglect of
monetary aggregates (Mayer, 1999; Bordo and
Schwartz, 1999; McCallum, 1999; and Hetzel,
2003). Nelson (2003) summarizes this literature
and documents the importance of neglecting
money—the monetary policy neglect hypothesis—
both in Britain and the United States.
Analytic errors contributed to inflationary
policy. Bad analysis and flawed theoretical under-
standing can lead to major policy mistakes, as in
the Great Depression. The Federal Reserve made
no effort to achieve analytic clarity on such basic
issues as the causes of inflation. Several of its
members doubted that it was worth the effort.
They did not respond to Darryl Francis’s efforts
to explain that (i) in the long run, inflation was
caused by money growth in excess of real growth
and (ii) Federal Reserve policy produced excess
money growth because it did not permit interest
rates to increase enough. Similarly, they did not
respond positively to Maisel’s efforts to adopt a
consistent policy framework.
Three morals: You cannot end inflation (i) if
you don’t agree on how to do it, (ii) if you and the
public think it is less costly to let it continue, and
(iii) if you are overly influenced by politics. The
Federal Reserve was better able to control infla-
tion when the President was named Eisenhower
or Reagan instead of Johnson, Carter, or Nixon.
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